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BARNETTE AND MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP: SOME 
UNANSWERED QUESTIONS 
Abner S. Greene* 
Justice Jackson’s opinion for the Court in West Virginia State Board of 
Education v. Barnette1 is deservedly famous. Yet, aspects of it raise more 
questions than they answer. Barnette is rightly seen as the foundation of the 
Supreme Court’s compelled speech doctrine. But key parts of that doctrine 
remain under analyzed by the Court. Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado 
Civil Rights Commission2 offered the Court an opportunity to clarify some of 
these issues. For religious reasons, Jack Phillips refused to provide a custom-
made cake for the wedding celebration of a gay couple, Charlie Craig and 
David Mullins. The Colorado Civil Rights Commission determined that this 
violated state public accommodations anti-discrimination law, and the state 
court of appeals affirmed. After the state supreme court declined to hear the 
case, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari; much of the briefing and 
oral argument was about whether requiring Phillips to make the cake would 
amount to unconstitutional compelled expression.3 But the Court resolved the 
matter on narrower, as-applied, Free Exercise Clause grounds.4 The 
underlying type of conflict in Cakeshop—between a statutorily protected 
class of persons and providers of services who claim a set of First 
Amendment objections to providing such services—is not going away any 
time soon, however,5 and thus it is fruitful to explore the issues from the 
Barnette line of cases, as refracted through cases such as Cakeshop. 
 
*Leonard F. Manning Professor of Law, Fordham Law School. Thanks to the FIU Law conference 
organizers for a terrific event. 
1 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
2 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
3 The more intuitively obvious claim—that applying the law to Phillips would violate his freedom 
of religion—would have failed under Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), which holds that courts 
should apply only rational basis scrutiny to laws of general applicability that are claimed to violate the 
Free Exercise Clause. 
4 The Court held that “[t]he Civil Rights Commission’s treatment of [Phillips’] case has some 
elements of a clear and impermissible hostility toward the sincere religious beliefs that motivated 
[Phillips’] objection.” Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729. 
5 See, e.g., Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017) (holding that there 
was no constitutional violation to apply state public accommodations anti-discrimination law to a florist’s 
refusal to provide flowers for a same-sex wedding); certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case 
remanded for further consideration in light of Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1719. See Arlene’s 
Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018). 
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Here are three compelled speech issues either directly implicated in 
Barnette or that flow from the doctrine Barnette spawned, all issues present 
in the Cakeshop litigation: (1) What is the proper level of judicial scrutiny 
when state action is claimed to compel expression unconstitutionally? In the 
compelled speech area, should the level of scrutiny differ between a law 
challenged as facially unconstitutional and an argument that an exemption is 
constitutionally required? What is the relationship, in First Amendment law 
generally, between as-applied challenges and claims for constitutionally 
compelled exemptions? (2) What counts as expression for compelled speech 
doctrine purposes? What is the relevance of whether a reasonable observer 
would understand the compelled speaker to be advancing her own views as 
opposed to merely obeying the law? When is compelled speech properly seen 
as endorsement, and what is the relevance for the doctrine of whether or not 
compelled speech is properly seen as endorsement? (3) In the more specific 
setting of providing goods and services, and the intersection between public 
accommodations anti-discrimination law and compelled speech claims, what 
is the relevant difference, if any, between denying a good or service without 
a specific requested message (say, “no cake for your same-sex wedding 
celebration!”) and denying a good or service with a specific requested 
message (say, “no cake for you if you insist that it say ‘God Loves Same-Sex 
Marriages’”)? What counts as even-handed versus improperly discriminatory 
administrative or adjudicative determinations in this setting? 
(1) In the first iteration of compelled flag salute/pledge of allegiance 
litigation, Minersville School District v. Gobitis,6 treated the matter almost 
entirely as a Free Exercise Clause case. Plaintiffs were Jehovah’s Witnesses 
arguing on behalf of their public-school children. The claim was not to 
invalidate the public-school teacher-led pledge, but rather that the 
Constitution compels an exemption for religious conscience. Three years 
after Gobitis answered no, Barnette overruled Gobitis. But the Court did not 
hold that the Free Exercise Clause requires an exemption in this kind of case. 
Rather, the argumentative terrain shifted to concerns about compelled 
speech. The Court held that the First Amendment (without clause 
specification) compels an exemption from public-school teacher-led pledge 
of allegiance, not that such activity is facially invalid.7 (And thus public-
school teacher-led pledge of allegiance continues throughout the land. How 
many school-age children know they have a right not to participate?!)8 Justice 
 
6 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
7 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
8 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592–96 (1992), invalidated clergy-led prayer at public school 
graduation ceremonies, on the ground that although the state did not legally coerce the children to attend 
and pray, nonetheless psychological coercion to attend and pray—or at least be perceived as praying—
was present. Accordingly, such clergy-led prayers are unconstitutional on their face; Lee is not about an 
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Jackson didn’t discuss levels of scrutiny, but the opinion reads as a strict-
scrutiny opinion. Once Jackson identified the constitutional harm—to the 
freedom to say what one wants to say and not to say what one does not want 
to say—he put the state to a tough justificatory test, which it failed. The state 
may seek to advance the end of national unity in many ways, said Jackson, 
but not by putting words in the mouths of schoolchildren. 
In the most famous recent First Amendment exemptions case, 
Employment Division v. Smith,9 Justice Scalia concluded something quite 
different about the proper level of judicial scrutiny. When faced with a neutral 
(i.e., nondiscriminatory) law of general applicability (i.e., not regarding 
religion alone), courts should adjudicate claims for religious exemption 
according to rational basis scrutiny only. So long as the state has a reasonable 
ground for demanding uniform obedience (and for not granting an 
accommodation), the state wins and the free exercise claimant loses. Thus, 
Oregon’s controlled substances laws could be applied to the Native American 
Church’s time-honored practice of ingesting peyote (a hallucinogenic drug) 
as part of a religious ritual. 
Next, let’s consider United States v. O’Brien.10 A federal statute 
prohibited knowingly destroying a military draft card (“certificate”); O’Brien 
publicly burned his draft card in an act of political protest; he argued that the 
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment protected his conduct. The Court 
rejected two versions of O’Brien’s claim. One was a facial challenge to the 
statute: that it was unconstitutional because enacted with the purpose of 
abridging free speech. The Court responded that it wouldn’t “strike down an 
otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative 
motive.”11 O’Brien also argued that the statute was “unconstitutional as 
applied to him”12 because his act of draft card destruction was symbolic 
speech protected by the First Amendment. The Court rejected this by 
applying the now eponymously famous O’Brien test, which is usually 
thought of (at least on its face) as intermediate scrutiny.13 The Court stated 
 
opt-out. One might think similar psychological coercion exists when public school children are asked to 
stand and recite the pledge of allegiance—even though formally speaking, after Barnette, they may opt 
out. The Court has never explained how, under the logic of Lee, public school teacher-led pledge of 
allegiance is constitutional. See Abner S. Greene, The Pledge of Allegiance Problem, 64 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 451 (1995). 
9 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
10 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
11 Id. at 383. 
12 Id. at 376. 
13 [A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the 
Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental 
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged 
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.  
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the short version of the test just before the full version: “when ‘speech’ and 
‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a 
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech 
element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.”14 
I want to discuss two things here. One, what is the difference between 
an exemptions claim and an as-applied claim, if any? Two, how does any 
such difference intersect with the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny? 
Exemptions claims arise in this way: A law on its face is constitutionally 
valid, and someone argues that a type of constitutional right is sufficiently 
powerful to trump whatever state interest there is in 100% uniform 
application. In this way, we can see Smith and O’Brien as making a similar 
type of argument—the controlled substances law and the draft card non-
destruction law were, facially, not problematic (once we are past O’Brien’s 
argument that improper legislative motive infected the draft card law). We 
don’t need to know specific facts to know whether these laws were 
constitutional as applied (more on this in a moment when I discuss a typical 
type of Free Speech Clause as-applied challenge). Smith argued, rather, that 
his free exercise of religion was significantly burdened by the controlled 
substances law and that such a burden ought to outweigh any state interest in 
uniform application. Similarly, O’Brien argued that his freedom of speech 
was significantly burdened by the draft card law and that such a burden ought 
to outweigh any state interest in uniform application. At least this is one way 
of understanding the two claims. We can see the Barnettes’ claim in the same 
light. The law requiring a teacher-led (and student-uttered) pledge of 
allegiance in public schools was, generally speaking, a valid exercise of state 
power. The Barnettes were not arguing that the pledge must be invalidated in 
toto, just that the application to their children significantly burdened their 
freedom of speech (of the compelled speech variety) and that such a burden 
ought to outweigh any state interest in uniform application. In this way, 
although the Court referred to O’Brien’s claim as an as-applied challenge,15 
we might do better to see it as a claim for exemption—alongside Smith’s and 
the Barnettes’ structurally similar claims. 
The standard free speech as-applied challenge is different. Take, for 
example, an incitement case. Let’s assume a law that facially comports with 
Brandenburg v. Ohio16 and punishes only incitement that is intended to cause 
imminent lawless action and is likely to cause such action. And let’s assume 
an arrest and prosecution of someone who falls short of one or both prongs 
 
Id. at 377. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 185 (1997) (referring to the O’Brien test 
as “intermediate First Amendment scrutiny”). 
14 O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376. 
15 Id. 
16 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
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of this test—e.g., a charismatic political counter-cultural figure who urges 
imminent lawless action in a setting where the state can’t show beyond a 
reasonable doubt that such action is likely to occur. This person’s 
constitutional defense isn’t that the law is facially invalid, nor that it is 
unconstitutionally overbroad (I am assuming a law that is not), but rather that 
because of the balance the Court has deemed the First Amendment to strike 
between public safety interests and political dissent, the law may not be 
constitutionally applied to her. This is one version of a classic as-applied 
challenge. Can we also see this as a claim for exemption? Probably not. My 
claimant wouldn’t be arguing that the law is generally valid but that she has 
a definable constitutional right in not following it—to speak, or to practice 
her religion. Rather, she’s arguing that the law, constitutionally understood, 
only goes so far, and that speech beyond that limit isn’t properly covered by 
the statute, so there’s no need for an exemption, just a claim of “no proper 
application.”17 This sounds like a pure statutory interpretation case, though. 
So let’s tweak the hypothetical a bit, and now assume that the law is written 
broadly enough to cover my hypothetical speaker, i.e., the law punishes 
incitement that is intended to cause imminent lawless action even if it is not 
likely to cause such action. Here, the speaker’s as-applied challenge is that 
the law may not constitutionally be applied to her.18 
Exemptions claims and as-applied claims do share the following quality: 
both involve weighing, at one stage of the process or another, and as either a 
first-order matter (on the substance) or second-order matter (regarding 
institutional concerns), the type and level of state interest against the damage 
to the claimed constitutional right. This is so despite the Court’s usually not 
using the term “weighing” or “balancing” or anything similar. Thus, Barnette 
is best seen—and easily seen, given Justice Jackson’s opinion—as pitting a 
strong right against compelled speech against a fairly weak state interest in 
insisting on uniform adherence to the pledge of allegiance rule. Smith pits a 
cardinal constitutional right to freely exercise one’s religion against a second-
order concern in keeping the judiciary out of the perils of case-by-case 
determination of which types of state interests can withstand the often 
idiosyncratic (to most eyes and ears) claims of religious necessity, and 
simultaneously in avoiding what the majority deemed a kind of anarchy that 
 
17 For an argument that exemptions and as-applied claims are basically the same thing, see 
Stephanie H. Barclay & Mark L. Rienzi, Constitutional Anomalies or As-Applied Challenges? A Defense 
of Religious Exemptions, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1595, 1597 (2018) (“[R]eligious exemption requests are just a 
version of what is generally thought of as one of the most common, modest, and preferred modes of 
constitutional adjudication: the as-applied challenge.”). 
18 This law may also be unconstitutionally overbroad, but (a) to be unconstitutionally overbroad, 
it would have to be substantially so, see Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615–16 (1973), and (b) 
the best understanding is that only a person to whom the law may be constitutionally applied has standing 
to raise an overbreadth claim. See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503–04 (1985). 
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would result if every man could be a law entire unto himself. O’Brien can be 
understood as deeming the government’s interest in an orderly draft card 
system as outweighing a dissenter’s desire to express his opposition to the 
war through an illegal action (rather than seeing it as his right to political 
protest more generally). And in my hypothetical incitement cases, after a long 
20th century struggle to understand and refine the right to advocate illegal 
action, in a political or ideological setting, the Court finally determined that 
the state interest in preventing intentional and likely imminent lawless action 
is high enough to outweigh the political speech right, but not otherwise. 
The level of scrutiny involved in all of these cases turns primarily on 
whether the state interest appears on the face of the law to be about expression 
(or religion), versus whether it appears to be about a non-rights-implicating 
matter of public health, safety, and the like. Why Smith insists on a rational 
basis test only, whereas O’Brien is a kind of intermediate scrutiny, is a 
question I put aside; in any event, O’Brien scrutiny, although formally 
intermediate, is generally understood as highly deferential to the government. 
Both cases involve facially neutral laws of general applicability, where there 
is less presumptive reason to think the state is up to some nefarious purpose 
involving restriction of religion or speech.19 The law in Barnette was 
generally applicable in one sense of the term—it didn’t single out anyone’s 
religion or speech—but, critically, the law and practice were all about 
expression, not about conduct more generally that might happen to be 
expressive. And any law regulating advocacy of unlawful action would also 
be directly about expression. In both of these latter settings, there is good 
reason for some kind of elevated judicial scrutiny20—either the strict scrutiny 
I claim the Court employed in Barnette, or the kind of categorical balancing 
present in Brandenburg and in a classic set of cases in which the Court 
permits regulation based on speech content but only pursuant to quite 
circumscribed tests that are usually strongly rights-favoring.21 
 
19 For arguments about the importance of government purpose in free speech doctrine, see Elena 
Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Government Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 
63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413 (1996); Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767 
(2001). 
20 This point about the law in Barnette (and in many of the compelled speech cases) being not 
generally applicable, in contrast with the laws in cases such as O’Brien and in many religious exemptions 
cases (such as Smith), is a key distinction between my analysis and that of Barclay and Rienzi. See Barclay 
& Rienzi, supra note 17, at 1599 (“[I]n the particularly relevant comparator context of compelled speech, 
courts regularly provide exemptions from generally applicable laws that mirror the exemptions critics fear 
in the context of religious exercise.”). 
21 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam); see also Miller v. California, 413 
U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity); N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (libel); Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words). Otherwise, if a law is content-based, the Court applies 
a kind of ad hoc strict scrutiny, very difficult for the government to satisfy. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. 
Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
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This leads us back to Cakeshop. The Colorado law is neutral and 
generally applicable,22 and the claim is for an exemption. This suggests that 
either the Smith or O’Brien approach is appropriate, and thus that rational 
basis or (weak) intermediate scrutiny is in order. There is no need for the kind 
of fact-intensive inquiry the Court uses in as-applied cases involving statutes 
that facially regulate expression.23 And there is no need for the stepped-up 
scrutiny of Barnette and its direct progeny—Wooley v. Maynard24 and 
National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra,25 which involve 
state insistence that individuals or companies use their property to help the 
state advance its message; or Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo26 and 
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission,27 which make 
certain speech content triggers to rights of reply that occupy the claimant’s 
property and expression space. 
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bi-Sexual Group of 
Boston,28 however, might give us pause before concluding that the state need 
not satisfy stepped-up scrutiny in cases such as Cakeshop. Massachusetts 
deemed its public accommodations, anti-discrimination law to apply to the 
private organizers of the annual St. Patrick’s Day Parade through the streets 
of Boston. The state could have adopted a different approach: once it ceded 
a public thoroughfare to a private group for a short period of time, it could 
have deemed the space not a place of public accommodation, but rather a 
space for private conduct (and expression) not subject to the anti-
discrimination rules. But the state deemed otherwise, and thus the organizers 
were subject to a mandate that they not discriminate on the basis of, inter alia, 
sexual orientation. The organizers didn’t want a group known as GLIB 
marching with a banner proclaiming “Irish American Gay, Lesbian and 
 
22 It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful for a person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, 
withhold from, or deny to an individual or a group, because of disability, race, creed, color, sex, 
sexual orientation, marital status, national origin, or ancestry, the full and equal enjoyment of the 
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of a place of public 
accommodation.  
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(2)(a) (2017). 
23 I put aside the fact-intensive inquiry the Masterpiece Cakeshop Court in fact engaged in, 
regarding the relevant state actors’ hostility toward the baker’s religious beliefs. 
24 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
25 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). I refer to the Court’s invalidation of the “licensed notice” provision of 
California law, requiring (in this case) anti-abortion family planning centers to help the state advertise 
availability of abortion providers. The Court’s invalidation of the “unlicensed notice” provision of 
California law is much harder to defend. For commentary on Becerra, see Abner S. Greene, “Not in My 
Name” Claims of Constitutional Right, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1475, 1495–98 (2018).  
26 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
27 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (plurality opinion). 
28 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
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Bisexual Group of Boston.”29 Relevant state actors held that exclusion a 
violation of the anti-discrimination law, and determined that GLIB was 
entitled to participate in the parade with its banner. The organizers argued, at 
the state level and to the U.S. Supreme Court, that this violated their First 
Amendment right against compelled expression, of the “right not to 
host/foster another’s speech” variety. 
Under the rubric set forth above, this looks like application of a neutral 
law of general applicability, and a claim of constitutionally compelled 
exemption. That would put this under the O’Brien heading, as a speech claim 
(as opposed to a religion claim, under Smith). Indeed, Hurley said that the 
state law is not “unusual in any obvious way, since it does not, on its face, 
target speech or discriminate on the basis of content,” the focus instead being 
to protect gays and lesbians (inter alia) from being denied “publicly available 
goods, privileges, and services.”30 The Court immediately pivoted, though, 
to this: that the law “has been applied in a peculiar way.”31 There was no 
claim or evidence that the organizers had excluded gay persons from 
participation in the parade. “Instead, the disagreement goes to the admission 
of GLIB as its own parade unit carrying its own banner.”32 Thus, the state 
court had required the organizers to “alter the expressive content of their 
parade.”33 In an extremely interesting sentence, the Court then observed:  
Although the state courts spoke of the parade as a place of 
public accommodation, once the expressive character of 
both the parade and the marching GLIB contingent is 
understood, it becomes apparent that the state courts’ 
application of the statute had the effect of declaring the 
sponsors’ speech itself to be the public accommodation.34 
But this would mean that any group of persons otherwise protected under the 
statute would have a right to “participate in [the organizers’] speech,”35 i.e., 
to coopt it or at least reshape it, if not intentionally, then in effect. And that 
would violate “the fundamental rule of protection under the First 
Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his 
own message.”36 
 
29 Id. at 570. 
30 Id. at 572. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 572–73. 
34 Id. at 573. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
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This is the key moment in the decision; everything that follows is further 
explanation and refinement of the same. So, first the Court reasoned that this 
is not a Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel37 case, in which the state 
is requiring dissemination of purely factual and uncontroversial 
information.38 The Court next explained that even though the parade 
organizers may not have been focused and consistent over time on which 
messages they included or excluded from their parade, that doesn’t take away 
their right to exclude whatever message they think would result from the 
GLIB group marching under its GLIB banner.39 After that, the Court 
distinguished three cases—two cable television “must carry” rules cases, and 
the case in which state law required a private shopping center to allow various 
speakers to engage in speech activity.40 Key facts uniting these three cases 
are the low risk of misattribution (of the compelled message to the compelled 
host) and the common practice and ease of the host’s posting a disclaimer of 
connection to various messages seen on the television channels in question 
or observed at the shopping center. This discussion is the high-water mark in 
the Court’s compelled speech jurisprudence for treatment of misattribution 
and disclaimer; I will say more about that in Part II. The upshot in Hurley is 
the Court’s determination that viewers generally see parades as a whole and 
that disclaimers in a moving parade would be odd.41 Thus, the risk of 
misattribution here is real, and disclaimers are not an appropriate 
recommended solution. 
Hurley does not mention levels of scrutiny. Once the Court determined 
that the “peculiar” application of the state law would require the organizers 
to alter their parade message, the case was over. There is a moment after that 
key analytic work is done when the opinion restates that on its face the law 
is perfectly valid but that as “applied to expressive activity in the way it was 
done here, its apparent object is simply to require speakers to modify the 
content of their expression to whatever extent beneficiaries of the law choose 
to alter it with messages of their own.”42 This is an interesting and perhaps 
unusual move—to redefine the state interest from the general one immanent 
in the law on its face to the specific, as-applied one. Once we redefine the 
state interest as requiring alteration of private speech content, strict scrutiny 
would seem appropriate and would (usually) be fatal.43 The opinion then 
 
37 471 U.S. 626 (1985). 
38 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573.  
39 Id. at 574–75. 
40 Id. at 575–80. For further discussion of these cases, see infra text accompanying notes 78–79. 
41 See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 576–77, 580. 
42 Id. at 578. 
43 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226–27 (2015) (holding that strict scrutiny 
applies to laws that are facially content-based; the case was about regulation of private speech, though, 
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makes one more approach at how to see this case: perhaps, it says, we can 
see the state’s objective as “forbidding acts of discrimination toward certain 
classes . . . to produce a society free of the corresponding biases.”44 That is a 
legitimate state end, but there is a problem if the means to such an end is to 
alter the organizer’s private message.45 
Laws of general applicability will have various types of application. 
Usually they will involve no countervailing claim of constitutional right, and 
thus a rational basis test is all that is needed to ensure legitimacy. If, however, 
the application involves administrative evaluation of speech content, then it 
is correct to employ strict scrutiny. So, for example, a disturbing the peace 
law is unproblematic facially (from a First Amendment perspective); but if 
the officer on the beat makes a content determination before deciding if the 
peace has been disturbed, we now need strict scrutiny.46 Otherwise, true 
intermediate scrutiny—not the kind that operates more like rational basis 
scrutiny (which arguably occurred in O’Brien itself)—can often properly 
balance state objectives against private constitutional rights claims. This is 
the best way of understanding Hurley. Massachusetts’ ends are laudable; 
most times, application of the law will root out constitutionally regulable 
discrimination; but sometimes—rarely it seems, as this was a “peculiar” 
case—the means to the laudable end will involve demanding that a private 
actor alter its expression. Implicit in the unanimous Hurley decision is a 
weighing—the right not to host/foster another’s speech gets significant 
weight, diminishing the weight the state’s anti-discrimination interest gets in 
typical public accommodations cases. 
If an iteration of Cakeshop returns to the Court, the Court similarly 
should apply O’Brien as true intermediate scrutiny. One among several hard 
questions will be whether it is proper to see the relevant business activity as 
expressive and thus as expression being altered by the otherwise 
unobjectionable anti-discrimination law. Even if the answer is yes (as I 
suggest in Part II it should be), there is still the matter of determining the 
 
not about compelled speech). Government should be able to satisfy strict scrutiny when its laws require 
alteration of speech content in the public health and safety disclosure/notice setting, if the speech is factual 
and not ideologically controversial. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 
(1985); see also Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2234–35 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (setting forth 
examples of compelled speech in the disclosure/notice setting, where I claim the state action in question 
should satisfy strict scrutiny). 
44 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 578. 
45 See id. at 579. 
46 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971) (invalidating, on strict scrutiny, a disturbing 
the peace/offensive conduct statute as applied to a person wearing a jacket in a courthouse corridor with 
the words “Fuck the Draft” visible); Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cty. Sheriff Dep’t, 
533 F.3d 780, 787–90 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying a general statute regulating disruption near schools to an 
anti-abortion truck displaying photos of aborted fetuses; because police made a content-based decision 
about the photos being disruptive, the court shifted from lower to higher scrutiny). 
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weight of the state interest in ensuring the provision of goods and services on 
a nondiscriminatory basis, which seems quite a bit higher than the state 
interest in ensuring access to a privately organized parade (albeit a place of 
public accommodation).47 
(2) The Cakeshop issue that took up the most briefing space, and the 
most oral argument time, was whether Phillips’ custom-made wedding cakes 
should count as expression for Free Speech Clause purposes. Phillips argued 
that this part of his business involves a kind of artistic creativity or 
expression48 and that even though this iteration of artistic creativity is a 
product for sale in a for-profit business, the First Amendment should cover 
the cake-making. Note that I am talking about “coverage,” not “protection,”49 
i.e., just about whether we are even in Free Speech Clause territory, before 
we get to questions of levels of scrutiny and state interest. Part of Phillips’ 
argument for First Amendment coverage was that with his custom-made 
wedding cakes he intends to celebrate and should be understood as 
celebrating the weddings for which the cakes are made.50 On the other side, 
some of the amicus briefs for the state and the gay couple (Craig and Mullins) 
argued (inter alia) that custom-made wedding cakes do not count as 
expression for First Amendment purposes. The American Unity Fund brief 
(by Professors Dale Carpenter and Eugene Volokh) drew a line between 
“writers, photographers, painters, singers, and similar speakers” who might 
be hired for a wedding (First Amendment covered expression) and “baking, 
clothing design, architecture, and other activities” (not First Amendment 
covered expression).51 The Freedom of Speech Scholars Brief (by Professor 
Steven Shiffrin) contended that “[m]usic falls within the scope of the First 
Amendment; the products of jewelers, florists, chefs, and bakeries do not, 
even though they involve skill and artistic judgment.”52 And the Brief of 
Professor Tobias B. Wolff claimed that Phillips’ business “is not engaged in 
 
47 It would have made more sense in the Hurley setting for Massachusetts either to have deemed 
the parade purely private, not subject to public accommodations law, or to have deemed the parade a type 
of state action, seeing the organizers as stepping into the shoes of the city. If this state action model were 
followed, then we would see the parade as a type of public forum, and the GLIB group with its banner 
would have had a right to participate. 
48 Brief for Petitioners at 1, 5, 8, 14–15, 17, 18–25, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil 
Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111). 
49 For more on this, see Greene, supra note 25, at 1509–11. 
50 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 48, at 2, 19, 21. 
51 Brief of American Unity Fund and Profs. Dale Carpenter and Eugene Volokh as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Respondents at 1, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 
1719 (2018) (No. 16-111) [hereinafter Brief of American Unity Fund]. 
52 Brief for Freedom of Speech Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 10, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111). 
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its own act of personal expression, it is providing a commercial service.”53 In 
any event, the gay couple and others contended, the reasonable observer 
would not understand the custom-made cake to be an expression of the 
baker’s views, but rather of the couple’s views; the baker, on this approach, 
is just following the law in baking the cake.54 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent 
adopts this position,55 whereas Justice Thomas’ concurrence in part and in 
the judgment rejects the relevance to compelled speech analysis of what a 
reasonable observer would think about the connection between a custom-
made wedding cake and the baker’s views about the wedding.56 
My views on this are as follows: We should accept Phillips’ claim that 
his custom wedding cake baking constitutes expression for First Amendment 
coverage; if a reasonable observer would misattribute the cake in this case 
(had it been made) to Phillips’ own convictions, that would be a sufficient 
ground to deem a prima facie Free Speech Clause violation to have occurred; 
but whether we should understand Phillips to be endorsing a same-sex 
wedding celebration for which he is baking a custom cake is not a necessary 
part of compelled speech analysis for First Amendment purposes. That is 
because claims such as Phillips’ are better understood under a broader 
rubric—what I call a “not in my name” claim of constitutional right, which 
is a claim of expressive association.57 Although such claims may involve 
misattribution analysis, they need not. This allows us to see, similarly, that 
we have to proceed with caution when analyzing the constitutionally relevant 
meaning of a set of private choices in response to a legal prohibition, 
requirement, or permission. 
The arguments against custom wedding cake baking as expressive are 
first-order and second-order. The first-order argument is that such a baker is 
just running a business, fulfilling customer demand, producing cakes as if he 
were producing any other good.58 But the argument cannot be that he is 
producing cakes as if he were producing widgets, because the whole point of 
a made-to-order business (or part of a business) is that the goods aren’t 
fungible. So the critic has to fall back on the claim that even if the cakes 
 
53 Brief of Professor Tobias B. Wolff as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 2, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111). 
54 Brief for Respondents Charlie Craig and David Mullins at 34–35, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. 
v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111); Brief of Professor Tobias B. Wolff, 
supra note 53, at 14; see also Craig & Mullins v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 286–87 
(Colo. Ct. App. 2015); Robert Post, An Analysis of DOJ’s Brief in Masterpiece Cakeshop, TAKE CARE 
(Oct. 18, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/an-analysis-of-doj-s-brief-in-masterpiece-cakeshop. 
55 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1748 n.1 (2018) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
56 Id. at 1744 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). 
57 See Greene, supra note 25, at 1478–79. 
58 See Brief of American Unity Fund, supra note 51, at 9–10. 
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aren’t fungible, and are customer-specific, they are still customer design-
driven. There would be something to this if the baker were just executing the 
customer’s design. Consider a company that will take your iPhone pictures 
and make them into a photo album. You select the pictures, determine how 
they’re going to appear, and then the company executes the order. If that’s 
how Phillips produces his cakes, then his claim for First Amendment covered 
expression would be weak. But it isn’t how he produces his custom-made 
wedding cakes. Rather, he has discussions with prospective customers, gets 
their ideas, and then has discretion regarding many of the details.59 A good 
analogy would be to a trompe l’oeil artist, who creates realistic looking 
backdrops for (say) people’s homes, with significant input from the 
homeowner but also discretion on how to execute the work.60 I would assume 
most readers would say this is First Amendment covered artistic expression. 
(Again, we are only now talking about coverage—are we in the Free Speech 
Clause area of tests, scrutiny, state interest, harm to speaker, etc.?—and not 
about the ultimate outcome of the case.) And consider the strip-club dancers 
in City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M.61 The case ended up presenting several difficult 
First Amendment questions. Before getting to them, the Court concluded that 
this kind of nude dancing for money is “expressive conduct,” though “within 
the outer ambit of the First Amendment’s protection [i.e., coverage].”62 One 
might have said the women involved were just doing this for money, as a 
business, to satisfy consumer demand. But the Court refrained from saying 
that, for good reason—how is one then to distinguish, for example, dancers 
who work for a living with the American Ballet Theatre? 
That leads us to the critics’ second-order argument. The claim is that if 
we open the door to seeing custom wedding cake bakers as engaged in First 
Amendment covered expression, then we will have to see all sorts of 
businesspersons as similarly covered. Some mention clothing design and 
architecture; and what about law firms, who engage in speech activity? 
Underlying this argument is the concern that judges can’t consistently 
adjudicate such claims and that there would be a floodgate of such claims and 
victories for businesspersons against public accommodations anti-
discrimination laws and perhaps other legal protections. My response here is 
similar to my response in the Free Exercise Clause exemptions setting63—we 
 
59 See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 48, at 7–8. 
60 See, e.g., JORDAN MURAL DESIGN, INC., http://www.philipjordan.com/index.html (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2018). 
61 529 U.S. 277 (2000). 
62 Id. at 289. 
63 See ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION: THE MULTIPLE SOURCES OF AUTHORITY IN A 
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 149–57 (2012); Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 
102 YALE L.J. 1611 (1993). 
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should accept the threshold claims of harm to a constitutionally protected 
interest and develop a kind of constitutional common law to properly balance 
these harms against state interests in uniform enforcement, interests that are 
often strong. If there is a good first-order argument for seeing clothing design 
and architecture as expressive, then we should appreciate that the state can 
interfere with such expression in all sorts of nefarious ways—both in 
restricting expression and in compelling it—but vote for the state in situations 
in which the state interest is sufficiently strong to outweigh whatever hit there 
is to the speech interest. As a first-order matter, it’s hard to deny that clothing-
designers-for-hire and architects-for-hire usually have creative expressive 
discretion packaged with whatever marching orders they have from their 
paying clients. 
If we accept (some) custom wedding-cake baking as expressive—for 
threshold Free Speech Clause purposes—then it shouldn’t matter whether we 
see this as pure expression or expressive conduct. What should matter for 
constitutional analysis is the nature of the state action involved. So, if 
someone is burning a draft card as an act of political protest, that is both pure 
expression—of a nonlinguistic sort, to be sure, but expression nonetheless—
and also conduct (burning something, expressive or not). If the government 
passed a law banning expressive burning of draft cards, that would trigger 
strict scrutiny; if it passed a law banning any burning of draft cards, then if 
applied to an expressive act, we should apply intermediate scrutiny (putting 
aside whether evidence of dissent-squelching purpose behind an otherwise 
neutral law of general applicability should elevate the level of judicial 
scrutiny). Even with a case involving pure expression with no possible 
expressive conduct twist—say, a painter in her studio—our ultimate concern 
is with the type of law and its balance with the type of expression. A law 
banning a certain type of chemical because of danger to health, as applied to 
a certain kind of paint a painter uses, will get much more relaxed scrutiny 
than a law banning a certain type of painting. But the First Amendment is in 
play in both instances. 
Part of Phillips’ argument was that any custom wedding cake he makes 
“announces through [his] voice that a marriage has occurred and should be 
celebrated.”64 And, regarding the cake that Craig and Mullins requested, 
Phillips argued that “any wedding cake he would design for them would 
express messages about their union that he could not in good conscience 
communicate.”65 His brief added, “A person viewing one of Phillips’s custom 
wedding cakes would understand that it celebrates and expresses support for 
 
64 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 48, at 2. 
65 Id. at 21. 
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the couple’s marriage.”66 On the other hand, Phillips recognized that if a 
reasonable viewer would understand the cake as compelled by law, such a 
viewer would not assume Phillips supports same-sex marriage; indeed, this 
is one of the arrows in the quiver of those opposing the compelled speech 
claim in this setting.67 Since such an argument would scuttle most of 
compelled speech case law, Phillips argued that this cannot be the right way 
to understand the free speech right at stake.68 Justice Thomas made the same 
point in his opinion supporting Phillips’ compelled speech claim.69 
Because a reasonable observer would understand speech compelled by 
law as not necessarily expressing anything about the speaker’s actual beliefs, 
and because we nonetheless have a robust compelled speech doctrine, 
whether misattribution is or is not present in a given case cannot be the crux 
of the constitutional analysis. The best way to understand the doctrine is that 
misattribution is a sufficient, but not necessary, ground for a prima facie 
claim of right.70 
Barnette contains no discussion regarding whether one would 
appreciate the pledge was compelled.71 Dissenting Justice Rehnquist in 
 
66 Id. at 24. 
67 See Post, supra note 54. 
68 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 48, at 30–31. 
69 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1744 (2018) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). 
70 For related discussion of the misattribution problem in the compelled speech case law, see 
Abner S. Greene, (Mis)Attribution, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 833, 839–44 (2010). Sometimes determining 
what beliefs to attribute to a particular person, in compelled speech situations, is difficult. One subset of 
this problem is what to make of a legal permission. So, after Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), 
was decided, Laurence Tribe wrote that the Court had created a conundrum for persons such as the 
Maynards: before the decision, if they displayed the “Live Free or Die” motto on their license plate (as 
opposed to covering it up, which they did and which generated the litigation), they could credibly claim 
they were just following the law and one should not assume they believed the motto’s message; but after 
the decision, if they now do not cover up the motto, one might assume they believe the motto’s message! 
Laurence H. Tribe, Disentangling Symmetries: Speech, Association, Parenthood, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 641, 
644 (2001). In his PruneYard concurrence, Justice Powell wrote very nearly the converse: before Wooley, 
people such as the Maynards were put to the difficult choice of merely complying with the law or doing 
that combined with dissenting by putting up (say) a bumper sticker (putting aside the third option of direct 
disobedience by covering up the motto, which the Maynards did), and, said Powell, if they did not put up 
the bumper sticker, one might think they agreed with the motto’s message! PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. 
Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 99 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). 
The problem with the Tribe and Powell analyses is that they make too much out of inaction (just as 
statutory interpreters should not make too much out of legislative inaction). In the face of a legal 
permission (rather than a prohibition or a requirement), a choice to not take up the permission could mean 
many things. Permitted to cover up the motto but don’t; permitted to put up a dissenting bumper sticker 
but don’t—do the failures to act indicate agreement with the motto’s message? They could, but they could 
also mean inertia or the desire not to stand out. Or probably other options as well. 
71 Although reasonable minds might differ on this point, it seems most likely that a compulsory 
public school pledge of allegiance would be understood as such. Accordingly, reasonable viewers and 
even the children themselves would appreciate that their mouthing the words of the pledge constitutes no 
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Wooley echoed the state supreme court’s point that displaying “Live Free or 
Die” on one’s car license plate conveyed no endorsement of that message—
in part because one may dissent in the same forum, as it were, by putting up 
a bumper sticker to the contrary.72 But the majority was unmoved by this 
argument, and didn’t even address it. Similarly, in the two “right of reply” 
cases in which certain speech content would trigger a right to take up space 
in another speaker’s property—Tornillo and Pacific Gas—the Court was 
mostly unconcerned about the fact that readers of the compelled speech 
would know that such speech was compelled. There is no mention of this in 
Tornillo;73 in a footnote in Pacific Gas, the Court dismissed the possibility of 
a disclaimer curing possible misattribution as sufficient to undo the 
constitutional harm to the utility that was compelled by law to carry an 
unwanted message.74 But this concern about possible misattribution was not 
front and center in the Court’s analysis. Hurley is the one compelled speech 
case in which misattribution seemed to play a role in the Court’s striking 
down state action. The Court was concerned that “GLIB’s participation 
would likely be perceived as having resulted from the Council’s customary 
determination about a unit admitted to the parade, that its message was 
worthy of presentation and quite possibly of support as well.”75 And it added: 
“Although each parade unit generally identifies itself, each is understood to 
contribute something to a common theme.”76 And this:  
Without deciding on the precise significance of the 
likelihood of misattribution, it nonetheless becomes clear 
that in the context of an expressive parade, as with a protest 
march, the parade’s overall message is distilled from the 
individual presentations along the way, and each unit’s 
expression is perceived by spectators as part of the whole.77 
Misattribution was a concern in Hurley, and the risk of such was perhaps a 
sufficient ground for the holding, but there’s no reason to believe the case 
 
endorsement. Thus, Justice Jackson engaged in rhetorical overkill when he wrote “the compulsory flag 
salute and pledge requires affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind,” West Virginia State Board of 
Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943), and when he wrote that a compelled pledge “force[s] 
citizens to confess by word or act their faith” in government orthodoxy, id. at 642. Affirmation and 
confession are better used for a situation in which the reasonable observer would understand the utterance 
to be authentic and/or the state is not only compelling the utterance but also not allowing dissent on the 
point in question. When dissent is open and misattribution is absent, the compelled utterance is not 
affirming anything or confessing to anything. See Greene, supra note 8, at 473–78. 
72 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 722 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
73 Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
74 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 15 n.11 (1986) (plurality opinion). 
75 Hurley v. Irish-Am., Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 575 (1995). 
76 Id. at 576. 
77 Id. at 577. 
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would have come out the other way had the Court been satisfied that viewers 
would have understood the GLIB banner was present under court order. The 
concern was deeper, or different: that the application of the law interfered 
with whatever message(s) the parade organizers wished to present. 
Finally, although Hurley is the one compelled speech case in which 
misattribution seemed to matter to the Court’s striking down state action, in 
a few cases upholding compelled speech, the Court deemed the absence of 
likely misattribution significant, as well as the possibility of disclaimer to 
avoid misattribution. This was so in the two cable television “must carry” 
cases,78 and in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins,79 where California 
required some private shopping center owners to permit some unwanted 
speakers on premises. 
We should conclude that misattribution risk is just a factor in an analysis 
that is best seen as balancing the nature and level of hit to the constitutional 
right against the state interest. Thus, in Barnette we have a significant harm 
(a compelled utterance) and a weak state interest (does the state really need 
to compel dissenting children to say the pledge to achieve some semblance 
of national unity?); in Wooley we have a lesser harm but still something 
personal (the cooptation of space on one’s vehicle) and a weak state interest 
(does the state really need to compel dissenting auto owners to carry the 
motto to advance the message of the motto?). The corporate claimants in the 
cable television cases are less personally affected by the must-carry rule, and 
the governmental interest in regulating the monopolistic nature of cable 
television is pretty strong. Similarly, the business claimant in PruneYard is 
less personally affected by the “must-host” rule, and the state interest in 
allowing various persons access to a space where people increasingly 
congregate (shopping centers, in many communities) is, if not compelling, at 
least a type of interest understood within First Amendment public forum 
doctrine. 
Thus, misattribution is relevant to the harm from compelled speech, and 
might even qualify as one subcategory of such harm, but (a) even when 
misattribution is present, the state interest might be high enough to outweigh 
the claim of constitutional right (it would have to be quite high to outweigh 
the harm from misattribution, but we should leave open the possibility that it 
could be), and (b) importantly for analyzing cases such as Cakeshop (and 
Barnette and Wooley), a harm of constitutional magnitude might exist when 
the state compels speech, even absent likely misattribution. That is the case 
with Phillips. If we understand his custom wedding cake-making as 
expressive, and appreciate that this is so even though it is also business 
 
78 See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189–90 (1997); Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 
U.S. 622, 655–56 (1994). 
79 447 U.S. 74, 85–88 (1980). 
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conduct, then even if we dismiss his argument that he is perceived as 
endorsing the weddings for which he bakes cakes, we might still see a harm 
of constitutional magnitude in the compulsion (again, before reaching the 
question of countervailing state interest and balancing). 
But what kind of harm is it? If people such as Phillips are not being 
prevented from speaking their minds, and are not being compelled to endorse 
messages with which they disagree, we might do better to understand the 
harm as something other than a violation of the freedom of speech. The thread 
that runs through the compelled speech cases, and the cases about compelled 
subsidies for speech, is better understood as sounding in the right of freedom 
of expressive association. Assuming a custom-made wedding cake 
constitutes expression (and I have argued above that it often does), then the 
baker is at least associated with what the cake celebrates. Association is the 
weaker cousin of endorsement and attribution. It can exist even when we 
know the state has compelled the connection, and thus when no one 
reasonably thinks the baker supports the wedding—or that he does not 
support it. But the cake aids and abets the celebration of the wedding, and 
thus the baker is complicit in the celebration.80 The state has forced his 
creative act to be associated with the celebration, which we may see as 
occurring (in small part, but in part nonetheless) in his name. All compelled 
speech claims may be understood as claims of expressive association (or, a 
right of expressive dis-association), and, in the vernacular, as “not in my 
name” claims of constitutional right. Thus, even though the harm in 
compelled speech cases may sometimes be understood in other ways—the 
use of the body in Barnette (via utterance); the use of personal property in 
Wooley; the use of business property in Becerra; the cooptation of another’s 
speech license in Hurley (and a misattribution concern); certain types of 
speech content triggering rights of reply in Tornillo and Pacific Gas—what 
unites these cases is a broader, weaker, yet still present harm to the freedom 
of expressive association. That is: to the freedom to contribute one’s 
expression to messages and ends of one’s choosing; to avoid whatever taint 
one may feel exists when that freedom is used toward another’s end (the 
state’s or a private party’s), via state action. This is also the common thread 
 
80 There is an interesting connection between the expressive association theory I am discussing 
here and understandings of complicity. But when we are thinking about a grounding theory for compelled 
speech claims (and compelled subsidies of speech claims), we must limit our complicity understanding to 
the expressive setting. For example, someone providing folding chairs for weddings, who doesn’t want to 
provide such chairs for a same-sex wedding, might still have a complicity-type argument—and that might 
sound in free exercise of religion terms (or would, at least as a prima facie claim, subject to weighing 
against state interest, if Smith were overruled)—but would not have an expressive association claim. For 
some thoughts about complicity claims in the First Amendment setting, see Greene, supra note 25, at 1483 
n.33 (discussing Amy J. Sepinwall, Conscience and Complicity: Assessing Pleas for Religious Exemptions 
in Hobby Lobby’s Wake, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1897 (2015), and Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, It’s About Money: 
The Fundamental Contradiction of Hobby Lobby, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 727 (2015)). 
04 - GREENE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/6/19 12:39 PM 
2019] Barnette and Masterpiece Cakeshop 685 
uniting the Abood v. Detroit Board of Education81 line of cases involving 
compelled subsidies for the speech of another private actor. And it helps 
explain why there is a presumptive violation of the right of expressive 
association that is overridden when the state compels subsidies for its own 
speech (Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association82): the state speaks for 
its citizens, and thus state speech is properly in the name of the citizens.83 
(3) Consider this: A gay male couple walks into a bakery and asks for a 
custom-made wedding cake; there is no discussion of whether the couple 
wants any written message on the cake. The baker says no, because although 
he will provide various products to gay men and lesbians, his religious 
scruples against same-sex marriage prevent him from making the cake this 
couple wants. And this: A religious Christian walks into a bakery and asks 
for a Bible-shaped cake with biblical verses condemning homosexuality. The 
baker says no, because although he will bake a Bible-shaped cake, he doesn’t 
want to be party to spreading the anti-gay message. The state deems the first 
baker to have discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation, but deems the 
second baker not to have discriminated on the basis of religion. Does this 
differential outcome reflect anti-religious bias on behalf of the state? 
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Cakeshop deems the differential 
treatment described here part of the evidence revealing anti-religion animus 
on the part of the state.84 His grounds for so concluding, however, although 
plausible, are not what ultimately interest me here, in part because in a similar 
future case, the state could rectify Kennedy’s concerns. Justice Gorsuch 
(joined by Justice Alito) and Justice Kagan (joined by Justice Breyer) wrote 
concurrences that engaged directly in attempting to answer the question I 
posed in the above paragraph. Kagan echoed the argument advanced by Craig 
and Mullins, and by Colorado:85 on the facts presented, Phillips rejected not 
a specific message, but the very idea of a custom-made cake for a same-sex 
wedding celebration. The state could reasonably deem this to be 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, a protected class under state 
law. On the facts presented, the bakers in the other case (where William Jack 
tried three times to get his anti-gay-marriage message baked into a cake) 
rejected those specific messages, and did not engage in discrimination on the 
basis of religion (also a protected class under the state law). The state permits 
businesses to say no because they don’t want to create a specific message; 
 
81 431 U.S. 209, 232–37 (1977). I refer to the part of Abood that by a 9-0 vote invalidated 
compulsory union fees in lieu of dues when supporting ideological union speech not connected to 
collective bargaining. 
82 544 U.S. 550, 562–67 (2005). 
83 For an elaboration of this “not in my name” idea, see Greene, supra note 25. 
84 Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1730–31 (2018). 
85 Id. at 1732–34 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
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that is not a protected class. On this logic, if Craig and Mullins had asked for 
a cake saying “God Blesses Same-Sex Marriage,” Phillips could plausibly 
have rejected that because he didn’t want to help spread that message, and 
not because of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. And if 
William Jack had walked into a bakery and asked not for a written message 
but for a cake for (say) his child’s religious communion, and had been 
rejected because the baker has religious (or secular) scruples against 
communion, that would constitute discrimination on the basis of religion. 
All of this seems pretty straightforward. Not that proving discriminatory 
purpose is easy; sometimes it is, sometimes it isn’t, and different kinds of 
evidence make cases easier or harder. But one may plausibly conclude that 
Phillips’ cake denial was based on sexual orientation and that the William 
Jack bakers’ denials were based on message-dislike and not on religion. 
Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence doesn’t exactly challenge this. He doesn’t say 
those two conclusions are implausible. What he says is that the relevant 
Colorado state actors reasoned differently in the two settings, differently in a 
way that betrays religious animus. Here is the relevant language from 
Gorsuch:  
[All of the] bakers knew their conduct promised the effect of 
leaving a customer in a protected class unserved. But there’s 
no indication the bakers actually intended to refuse service 
because of a customer’s protected characteristic. We know 
this because all of the bakers explained without contradiction 
that they would not sell the requested cakes to anyone, while 
they would sell other cakes to members of the protected class 
(as well as to anyone else). So, for example, the bakers in the 
first case would have refused to sell a cake denigrating same-
sex marriage to an atheist customer, just as the baker in the 
second case would have refused to sell a cake celebrating 
same-sex marriage to a heterosexual customer. And the 
bakers in the first case were generally happy to sell to 
persons of faith, just as the baker in the second case was 
generally happy to sell to gay persons. In both cases, it was 
the kind of cake, not the kind of customer, that mattered to 
the bakers.86 
Gorsuch then argues:  
In Mr. Jack’s case, the Commission chose to distinguish 
carefully between intended and knowingly accepted 
effects. . . . Yet, in Mr. Phillips’s case, the Commission 
 
86 Id. at 1735–36 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
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dismissed this very same argument as resting on a 
“distinction without a difference.” . . . It concluded instead 
that an “intent to disfavor” a protected class of persons 
should be “readily . . . presumed” from the knowing failure 
to serve someone who belongs to that class.87 
Justice Kagan’s response challenges Justice Gorsuch’s claim that 
Phillips was refusing to sell a cake celebrating same-sex marriage. Rather, 
she argues, he was refusing to sell a custom-made wedding cake to a same-
sex couple that he would have sold to an opposite-sex couple.88 On the other 
hand, the William Jack bakers would not have sold the cake with the anti-
same-sex marriage language to anyone. This is a powerful response, and 
perhaps adequate to beat Gorsuch at his game. But perhaps not. Because 
underlying Gorsuch’s reasoning is an acceptance of Phillips’ argument that a 
custom-made wedding cake for a same-sex marriage expresses celebration of 
that marriage with or without specific celebrating words on the cake. To some 
extent this smuggles in an answer to a key question in the compelled speech 
debate in this case. But let’s take Phillips’ side of the debate on that question 
(as I have done above): his custom wedding cake making is always 
expressive, and at least is always associated with the wedding celebration, 
even if it’s not proper to say the cakes endorse the weddings in question or 
that we can attribute support for such weddings to Phillips. We might then 
agree with Gorsuch that Colorado has treated the two cases differently in 
terms of reasoning from knowledge to intent for Phillips but not for the 
William Jack bakers. 
But, contrary to Justice Gorsuch’s key next step in his argument, such 
differential reasoning does not necessarily reflect religious animus. It all 
depends on what we make of a state actor’s taking a kind of judicial notice 
of these social facts: gay and lesbian people get same-sex married, straight 
people do not. (I’m sure we could find some examples, but they must be small 
in number and are not what the same-sex marriage debate is about.) Thus, 
denying a cake for a same-sex wedding celebration that one would bake for 
an opposite-sex wedding celebration is treating a gay or lesbian couple 
differently from how one would treat a straight couple. (Here, I have to 
acknowledge that sometimes a gay man marries a woman, and sometimes a 
lesbian marries a man, and sometimes a gay man marries a lesbian, but again 
usually opposite-sex couples are straight, sexually speaking.) The gap 
between knowing the cake is for two gay men and intending to treat the two 
gay men differently from how one would treat a straight man and a straight 
woman is vanishingly thin. Generally, the state does not have to prove a more 
 
87 Id. at 1736. 
88 Id. at 1733 n.* (Kagan, J., concurring). 
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specific intent to prevail in an anti-discrimination law case (i.e., it does not 
have to show that the covered person or business had the intention to 
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, as a kind of meta-intention). 
In the William Jack cases, the bakers are on much more solid ground in 
saying they would not sell that message to anyone, religious or not, and even 
though they know Jack himself wants the message out of deep religious faith, 
there is a clear gap between that knowledge and any plausible conclusion of 
religious discriminatory intent. 
 
